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Abstract
A repo auction is a multi-unit common value auction in which bidders submit de-
mand functions. Such auctions are used by the Bundesbank as well as the European
Central Bank as the principal instrument for implementing monetary policy. In this
paper, we analyze a repo auction with a uniform pricing rule. We show that under
a uniform pricing rule, the usual intuition about the value of exclusive information
can be violated, and implies free riding by uninformed bidders on the information of
the informed bidders, lowering payoff of the latter. Further, free riding can distort
the information content of auction prices, in turn distorting the policy signals, hin-
dering the conduct of monetary policy. The results agree with evidence from repo
auctions, and clarifies the reason behind the Bundesbank’s decision to switch away
from the uniform price format. Our results also shed some light on the rationale
behind the contrasting switch to the uniform price format in US Treasury auctions.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are now widely recognized as a very important policy tool, and multi-unit auc-
tions of various degrees of complexity are regularly used in a variety of settings including
treasury bill sales, allocation of telecom licences, as well as electricity markets(1). Usu-
ally, such auctions aim to generate an efficient allocation, and raise as high a revenue as
possible. An interesting contrast is presented by auctions for selling money. Known as
repo auctions(2), these implement monetary policy in several countries, primarily aiming
to signal the central bank’s monetary policy stance.
Repo auctions constitute the principal instrument of money-market management by the
Eurosystem(3). On average, around three-quarters of annual central bank money require-
ments are met through these auctions. In particular, for the Bundesbank, the importance
of repo auctions as a reserve management tool increased dramatically in the mid 80s.
Taking after the Bundesbank, The European Central Bank also uses these auctions as
the primary instrument for conducting monetary policy. However, very little is known
about the theoretical properties of such auctions. Further, the most important aspect of
monetary policy as implemented through repo auctions is to signal policy stance to the
market. Thus it is very important to know the whether certain auction forms are likely
to weaken the signalling ability.
In this paper we explore the structure of bidding in a repo auction (which, as we explain
later, is a multi-unit common-value auction) with a uniform pricing rule(4), and explore
the problems that arise in the presence of heterogeneously informed bidders. Anecdotal
evidence from Bundesbank repo auctions using uniform pricing suggests that large banks
were unhappy with the pricing rule. Further, an interesting investigation by Nautz (1997)
finds evidence of a specific information distortion under this pricing rule: lower repo rates
are more informative than higher rates. Our results predict precisely such a distortion,
(1)see Klemperer (1999) for a discussion of the recent literature on auctions including multi-unit auctions.
(2)We discuss these auctions in detail later in this section.
(3)In contrast, the main policy rate in the US is the overnight interbank rate, and the Fed conducts its
monetary policy through open market operations by directly dealing with a few primary dealers.
(4)Under a uniform pricing rule all winners pay the same price, which is the price at which the market
clears. In a repo auction, bidders bid interest rates that they pay to the central bank, rather than prices.
However, interest rates map one-to-one into prices - so the use of the term “price” in repo auctions is
without loss of generality.
and also show how this pricing rule creates a disadvantage for larger and more informed
banks. In clarifying the evidence, the results also explain the reasons for the subsequent
change away from a uniform pricing rule. At the same time, our results throw light on the
opposite case of the US Treasury, which decided to switch entirely to a uniform pricing
rule in selling debt.
In terms of the literature on auction theory, our results extend the theory of single unit
common value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders. With multiple units and a
uniform pricing rule, the division of profits between the informed and uninformed bidders
can be surprising. The uninformed bidders can free ride on the information of the informed
reflected in the market clearing price, and thus make a positive profit.
Before discussing the results further, let us clarify the structure of repo auctions. Since
the early 1980s many European central banks have used securities repurchase operations
(repo) to manage the money market. In a repo, a central bank provides liquidity to
banks by buying securities that the banks agree to buy back at a forward date (say two
weeks). In other words, a central bank repo provides reserves to banks for a specified
period against securities that act as collateral.
The interest rate at which liquidity is provided is decided through an auction. In a
fixed-rate repo auction, the interest rate is set by the central bank and banks bid only
quantities. A variable rate repo auction, however, is a multi-unit auction in which the
bidders submit multiple price-quantity pair bids (demand functions), and the pricing
rule is either discriminatory or uniform-price(5). In a discriminatory auction bidders pay
their own bids for units they win in an auction. In a uniform price auction, in contrast,
all winners pay the market clearing price, which is defined as the highest bid at which
aggregate demand equals or exceeds supply (i.e. the lowest price at which some positive
quantity is won by some bidder)(6).
(5)The banking industry often refers to discriminatory auctions as “American” auctions and to uniform-
price auctions as “Dutch” auctions. However, the literature on auctions refer to descending auctions
(which are very different from uniform-price auctions) as Dutch auctions. To avoid confusion, we simply
use the name uniform-price auction.
(6)An alternative definition of market clearing price is the highest losing bid. However, the definition
used here is the definition used in practice in repo auctions, as well as other multi-unit auctions such as
Treasury auctions, index-linked bonds sales, IPO auctions, and corporate bond auctions.
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The demand for reserves by banks depends partly on the requirement for settlement bal-
ances arising out of the institutional characteristics of payment and settlement arrange-
ments. This part of the demand (which is the private value component) is very insensitive
to interest rates(7). Thus the private value component of the demand is of little impor-
tance in the analysis. The other part of the demand for reserves depends entirely on
expectations about future interest rates. Since repo rates determine future refinancing
conditions for a bank, such expectations matter a great deal(8).
Thus signalling of policy stance, rather than liquidity management, is most important
aspect of monetary policy implementation. The importance of expectations also implies
that a common value auction model in which the quality of a bidder’s guess about the
future plays an important role is the natural setting for analyzing repo auctions.
Given the importance of signalling, uniform price repo auctions present a problem. The
Bundesbank used uniform price auctions until 1988, but then abandoned the format in
favor of discriminatory auctions. In 2001, the Reserve Bank of India introduced uniform
price repo auctions for its liquidity adjustment facility. Within a year, however, they were
substituted by discriminatory auctions. In both cases, the reason appears to be the fact
that some bidders had bid high interest rates(9). In view of this, an informal argument
often put forward goes as follows: in a uniform price auction there is an incentive to bid
at very high rates which implies bidders do not bid their true demands, but exaggerate
their bids. This in turn implies that repo rates are too high, which therefore give the
(7)See Borio (1997).
(8)See Nautz (1998) for a formal model showing that influence of uncertainty, and the consequent
importance of expectations about the future course of monetary policy, is characteristic of a flexible
monetary policy design based on repo auctions. Further, As Borio (1997) points out, the remuneration
of the reserve requirement of banks is equal to the average main refinancing rate (the repo rate in case
of Bundesbank) during the reserve period (1 month for the Bundesbank). This allows a bank to make
a profit at the expense of the central bank, as long as it can finance its positions through the central
bank auctions. If a bank expects, say, the policy rate to rise during the period, it could borrow from
the central bank early in the period and, if the expectation turns out correct, would make an expected
profit simply by holding those funds as required reserves. Of course, the profit would be negative if the
expectations are incorrect.
(9)In a recent statement on monetary policy, the Governor of Reserve Bank of India said that “an
important disadvantage of the uniform price system is that, as bidders are sure to succeed at the most
favourable rate, there is a possibility of indiscriminate or irresponsible bidding out of alignment with the
market” (see Reserve Bank of India (2002)). See also Ministry of Finance, India (2002).
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wrong signals to the money market.
Both strands of this argument are problematic. The idea of a “true” demand makes sense
only in a private value setting, and as we showed above, a common value framework is
the most appropriate in analyzing repo auctions. In any case, even in a setting with
private value elements, uniform price auctions lead to demand reduction, not demand
exaggeration. As Ausubel and Cramton (1998) have shown, any equilibrium in a uniform
price auction is characterized by demand reduction by bidders (shading of bids to obtain
a better price), which results in inefficiency. Further, if indeed repo rates are always
too high in equilibrium, bidding at lower rates would be a profitable deviation for any
bidder. Thus the informal argument is clearly unsatisfactory, and the nature of distortion
arising in a uniform price auction is not well understood. Our results explain the nature
of distortion arising in repo auctions through free riding.
Apart from signalling, our analysis applies to other concerns arising in similar auctions.
In the longer-term repo auctions, signalling is of little importance, but private information
about the future term structure of interest rates is perhaps even more important compared
to short-term repos. In March 1999, the ECB switched the auction format for longer-term
repos from uniform-price to discriminatory. In a press conference, the governor said(10):
“The single rate method was chosen in order to encourage less experienced counterparties
to participate in the tender. The Governing Council takes the view that all interested
counterparties should by now be sufficiently accustomed to the longer-term refinancing
operation also to be in a position to participate in this type of operation under the more
market-oriented multiple rate (American) method of allotment.”
The concern clearly is that uniform price auctions give an undue advantage to less well
informed bidders. Our results show how the choice of auction format can change the
division of surplus between informed and uninformed bidders, and explain the policy
choice.
Let us now discuss the results. Aside from the bidders, we allow for the presence of out-
siders, who would enter if they could earn a strictly positive profit. Thus any equilibrium
must satisfy a “no-arbitrage” condition: given the equilibrium strategies of the bidders,
an uninformed outsider cannot profitably enter. Such a condition is perhaps a natural
(10)Source: European Central Bank (1999)
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condition in the context of auction markets. Further, we require equilibria to be robust
to any cost of entry or bidding. The no-arbitrage condition and robustness to entry cost
help us characterize all potential equilibria.
We show that any equilibrium in which uninformed bidders participate is characterized by
free riding by the uninformed on the information of the informed. A uniform pricing rule
allows uninformed bidders to condition on equilibrium price, and this limits the informed
bidders’ ability to gain from their information. Thus under a single price rule (which is
the natural pricing rule is most markets) the question of information rent is moot, and
depends on the extent of free riding by less informed bidders. The result contrasts with
the usual intuition about the value of exclusive information.
Further, we show that the presence of large number of uninformed bidders in the repo
auctions of the Bundesbank can distort the information content of auction prices so that
higher prices are less informative than lower prices. As mentioned above, Nautz (1997)
shows that when the Bundesbank used uniform price repo auctions, the money market
adjusted almost completely to low repo rates, while very little adjustment occurs when
repo rate is high(11). Our results explain this phenomenon.
Our results also apply to other multi-unit common-value auctions such as Treasury auc-
tions. We use our results to shed light on the recent shift to uniform price auctions by
the US Treasury, and comment on the potential reasons behind differences in Treasury
auction formats across countries.
2 The Model
S > 1 units are offered for sale. Each unit has a value V . This is a random variable with
a continuous distribution function F (·) and density function f(·) over a support [0, V ].
The distribution of V is public information.
There are NI informed and NU uninformed bidders. I and U also denote the sets of
informed and uninformed bidders, respectively. Uninformed bidders have access to only
(11)Repo rate is low when the difference between the repo rate and the money market rate before the
auction is below median. A high repo rate is defined analogously. Also note that a higher auction “price”
corresponds to a higher repo rate. See footnote (4).
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public information.
Each informed bidder receives a signal. Let X = (X1, . . . , XNI ) denote the vector of
signals where Xi is the signal received by informed bidder i, i ∈ I. Let g(Xi|V ) denote
the conditional density of Xi given the common value V . Conditional on V , the random
variables X1, . . . , XNI are independently and identically distributed.
2.1 Bids and Strategies
A bid is any decreasing function q(p) mapping the set of prices(12) [0, V ] to the set of
quantities {0, 1, . . . , S}. Since there are S discrete units, a bid function is a step function:
q(p) =


0 for p1 < p 6 V ,
1 for p2 < p 6 p1,
...
...
S for 0 6 p 6 pS,
The following representation of a bid function is very useful. Note that the inverse of a
bid function can be derived as follows:
p(q˜) =
{
maxp{p|q(p) ≥ q˜} if this exists,
0 otherwise.
The resulting function p(·) is the inverse demand function, and thus a bid can be written
as a vector (p1, . . . , pS), such that
p(q) =


p1 over 1 unit,
p2 over 2 units,
...
...
pS over S units,
where
V > p1 > p2 > . . . > pS > 0. (2.1)
(12)As explained in footnote (4), bidders in a repo auction bid interest rates, but the use of the term
“price” is without loss of generality. In particular, a higher price corresponds to a higher interest rate
in a repo auction. In a Treasury auction, on the other hand, the interest is paid by the Treasury to the
bidders - so a higher price corresponds to a lower interest rate.
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Let Ω be the set of vectors (p1, . . . , pS) that satisfy (2.1). Then Ω ⊂ ℜ
S
+ is the set of bid
functions. Note that this is compact and convex.
Figure 1 shows the set of bids Ω for S = 2.
Ω
0 V
V
p
p
1
2
Figure 1: The set of bids for S = 2.
Without loss of generality we restrict attention to pure strategies for the informed bid-
ders. A pure strategy for informed bidder i is written as qi(p)(Xi). A pure strategy for
uninformed bidder j, j ∈ U is simply a bid qj(p) ∈ Ω. A mixed strategy for uninformed
bidder j is given by a probability distribution µj over Ω.
2.2 Market Clearing Price and Allocation Rule
The market clearing price is defined as follows.
Definition 1. For any K 6 S, the market clearing price m(K) is given by the highest
price at which demand exceeds or equals K units. Thus
m(K) = sup
p
(
p|
∑
i∈I
qi(p)(·) +
∑
j∈U
qj(p) > K
)
.
Finally, the quantity won by a particular bid needs to be specified. Suppose bidder
ℓ submits a demand function qℓ(p) specifying positive prices for k units, k 6 S, and
ℓ ∈ I ∪ U . Also, let k′ be the highest integer below k such that pk′ > pk. Finally, let Qˆ
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be total demand at prices strictly above m(S). The winning function qwℓ (p) is specified
below.
qwℓ (p) =


k if pk > m(S),
k′ + αℓ(S − Qˆ) if pk = m(S),
0 otherwise,
where
αℓ =
k∑
i∈I
qi(m(S))(·) +
∑
j∈U
qj(m(S))
Thus if the price bid is above the market clearing price, the bidder wins the associated
quantity bid, and if the price bid is equal to the market clearing price, a bidder wins a
fraction of the remaining supply of S − Qˆ proportional to the ratio of his own demand to
total demand at the market clearing price(13).
Each winning bidder pays the market clearing price for each unit won.
2.3 Equilibrium
Definition 2. An equilibrium is a strategy profile that is (i) a (Bayesian) Nash equilib-
rium, (ii) satisfies the following no arbitrage condition: given the equilibrium strategies,
no new uninformed bidder can enter and earn a strictly positive payoff, and (iii) is robust
to an entry cost - i.e. the strategy profile continues to satisfy the previous two conditions
if a small positive entry cost c > 0 is introduced.
2.4 Informational Free Riding
We define free riding as follows. Uninformed bidder j is said to free ride on the information
of the informed bidders over Kj > 0 units if there is some p∗ > 0 in the support of the
market clearing price m(S) such that: (Condition 1) uninformed bidder j wins Kj units
whenever market clears below p∗, and (Condition 2) total uninformed demand is less
than total supply, i.e.
∑
j∈U
Kj < S.
(13)If αℓ(S−Qˆ) is not an integer, the bidder is allocated the greatest integer less than this. The remaining
unit is then allocated randomly according to proportional probabilities.
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A special case of free riding occurs if all uninformed bidders demand all their units above
even the highest market clearing price. In this case p∗ = m(S), and the uninformed
bidders win
∑
j∈U Kj units at market clearing prices dictated only by bids of informed
bidders. This case is called extreme free riding.
The next section presents an example of equilibrium with free riding. The two following
sections characterize equilibria given that some of the participating bidders are unin-
formed. Proofs not in the body of the paper are collected together in the appendix.
3 Equilibrium with Free Riding: An Example
In this section we analyze a simple common-value multi-unit uniform-price auction and
construct an equilibrium with free-riding.
There are 2 informed and 2 uninformed bidders. Let Xi denote the signal of informed
bidder i, i ∈ {1, 2}. Signals X1 and X2 are independently and uniformly distributed on
the interval [0, 1]. S > 1 units are being auctioned. Each unit auctioned has a common
value (X1 +X2)/2.
The following strategies form an equilibrium.
1. Uninformed bidder j submits the following demand function:
demand
{
Kj > 1 units at all prices 0 < p 6 1, and,
S units at price 0,
where K1 +K2 = S − 1.
2. Informed bidder i receiving signal Xi = xi submits the following demand function:
demand Li > 1 units at price xi/2.
where L1 + L2 > S.
In this equilibrium the uninformed bidders win all but 1 unit, and informed bidders win
only 1 unit. Given the bids of the uninformed bidders, the informed bidders face a single-
unit first-price auction. The market clears at the winning bid in this auction. Since the
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market only clears at prices bid by informed bidders, this is a case of extreme free riding
by uninformed bidders over (S − 1) units.
We must now show that the strategies above form an equilibrium.
Proof: First, given the strategy profile of uninformed bidders, each informed bidder can
win at most 1 unit. The informed bidder with the highest price bid wins 1 unit and his
bid is also the market clearing bid. Thus informed bidders face a single-unit first-price
auction.
Since only the price bid over the first unit matters for informed bidders, we refer to this as
their “bid.” Suppose the symmetric equilibrium informed bid is given by β(xi) for signal
Xi = xi. Suppose bidder 2 follows the equilibrium strategy and suppose bidder 1 bids a
price b. The payoff of bidder 1 is given by
Prob(b > β(X2))E
(
x1 +X2
2
− b | b > β(X2)
)
,
which simplifies to (
β−1(b)
) (
x1/2 + E(X2/2|X2 6 β
−1(b))− b
)
.
Maximizing with respect to b, and substituting the equilibrium condition that b = β(x1)
in the first order condition, we have the following equation:
1
β ′(x1)
(
3x1
4
− β(x1)
)
+ x1
(
1
4β ′(x1)
− 1
)
= 0.
This simplifies to x1β
′(x1) + β(x1) = x1. Solving this first order differential equation, we
get β(x1) = x1/2. This proves that the stated strategy for each informed bidder is indeed
a best response given the strategies of the uninformed bidders.
Next, we need to show that the strategies of the uninformed bidders are best responses.
First, if an uninformed bidder demands a further unit at any positive price p, the market
now clears at the maximum of p and the highest price on the first unit submitted by
informed bidders, rather than only the latter. Thus there is a loss of payoff over the
infra-marginal units. On the marginal unit, the extra payoff is
Prob(p > max{X1/2, X2/2})E (X1/2 +X2/2− p | p > max{X1/2, X2/2}) (3.1)
which is clearly non-positive. Second, if an uninformed bidder demands a unit less,
that does not lower the market clearing price, and thus lowers the payoff. Thus there
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is no profitable deviation in terms of quantity demanded. Finally, the market does not
clear at uninformed price bids, and by deviating to any price below the market clearing
price an uninformed bidder would win no units. These two facts imply that there is
no profitable deviation from the price at which uninformed bidders demand their units.
These arguments prove that the strategies of the uninformed bidders are indeed best
responses.
Finally, we need to show that the candidate equilibrium strategies satisfy no-arbitrage,
and are robust to the introduction of an entry cost. First, an entrant, by entering and
bidding a price p > 0 earns at most the payoff given by (3.1). Since this is non-positive,
the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied. Next, the equilibrium is robust to the introduction
of an entry cost as every bidder earns a positive payoff. Indeed, the total payoff of the
uninformed bidders is simply (S − 1) times the payoff of the winning informed bidder.
This completes the proof.‖
4 Characterizing Equilibria I
The following result derives a condition that must be satisfied by the aggregate demand
of informed bidders. This is very useful in proving the theorem that follows.
Let the aggregate demand of informed bidders be denoted by PI(Q) = (PI1, . . . , PIS).
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium not characterized by extreme free riding over
(S − 1) units, the profile of bids by the informed bidders must satisfy
E(V − b|b > PI1) < 0 (4.1)
for any price b in the support of m(S).
The following theorem characterizes equilibria.
Theorem 1. All equilibria are characterized by free riding by the unin-
formed bidders.
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While the formal proof is in the appendix, the idea of the proof is as follows. To understand
the idea, the following concept is useful: two bidders are said to “compete directly over 1
unit” if the higher of the two prices bid on that unit wins that unit and is also the market
clearing bid.
Let us now explain the proof idea. As lemma 1 shows, the no-arbitrage condition imposes
a certain lower bound on PI1, the price at which the aggregate informed demand is one
unit. We show that given this lower bound, any uninformed bidder competing directly
with PI1 and winning would earn a negative payoff.
Next, the fact that any equilibrium must be robust to an entry cost implies that each
uninformed bidder submits prices above a certain positive lower bound on some units.
We show that this implies condition (1) of the definition of free riding (in section 2.4) is
satisfied whenever condition (2) holds. Finally, we need to show that condition (2) holds.
using the lower bound on uninformed bids, we show that whenever the total demand by
uninformed bidders is S units (or more), and they win all S units (which must happen
with positive probability), there is some uninformed bidder who wins the S-th unit by
competing directly with PI1. But as we said above, this is not profitable. Thus so long
as the total demand by uninformed bidders is S units (or more), some uninformed bidder
has a profitable deviation to demanding a lower quantity. This implies that the total
quantity demanded by uninformed bidders must be below S, which satisfies condition (2)
of the definition of free riding, and completes the proof.
5 Characterizing equilibria II
The last section showed that uninformed bidders can free ride and therefore profit at the
expense of informed bidders under a uniform price format. In showing this, there is an
implicit assumption that the total quantity bid by uninformed bidders at positive prices
can be less than total supply - i.e.
∑
j∈U Kj < S. In this section we consider the other
possibility: with a large enough number of uninformed bidders, no single bidder might be
able to guarantee that the total uninformed quantity never exceeds total supply.
This case is important to consider because an important feature of the repo auctions
conducted by the Bundesbank and the ECB is that there are a large number of bidders.
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For the Bundesbank, the number of eligible counterparties (potential participants in repo
auction) at the end of 2001 was 1,476. An average of 274 bidders participated in the weekly
main repo auctions in 2001, and 166 in the monthly longer-term repo auctions(14). A few
of these bidders are large banks who participate regularly(15). These banks are likely to
be more experienced in forming expectations about the future course of monetary policy.
However, these are not the only participants. For the ECB, for instance, a democratic
and open process of liquidity provision, which gives all banks a chance to participate, is
a stated goal.
If bidders other than bidder j bid on a total quantity of S − 2 units or less, bidder j can
always ensure that total quantity bid by uninformed bidders is less than supply. In this
case, we know from the previous section that an equilibrium exists, and is characterized
by free riding. To focus on the other case, we assume the following.
Assumption 1. Any price p at which
∑
j∈U qj(p) > 0, Prob
(∑
j∈U qj(p) > S
)
> 0.
This condition of course rules out free riding as defined in section 2.4. We modify the de-
finition to “partial free riding” which is defined similarly to free riding (in section 2.4),
but the second condition now changes to Prob(
∑
j∈U Kj < S) > 0.
We now characterize equilibria under the above assumption, and show that the twin
objectives of signalling monetary policy and open participation can conflict with each
other.
Let mU(S) be the market clearing price from only uninformed bids, and let mU(S) be the
highest such price. Second, let mI(S) be the market clearing price when the probability
that some units are being won by informed bidders is positive, and let mI(S) be the
highest such price. Thus
mU(S) = sup
(
p | Prob
(∑
j∈U
qj(p) > S
)
> 0
)
,
(14)Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2001). The numbers for the Eurosystem as a whole at the same time
were 2500, 404, 225 respectively.
(15)For example, for fine tuning operations, only a small group of institutions are considered on the basis
their activity in the money market or the foreign exchange market. At present, the Bank could call,
in case of need, on a maximum of 41 counterparties (less than 3% of the number of potential bidders
in regular repo auctions) for money-market operations and 15 for foreign exchange market operations.
(Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2001)).
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and
mI(S) = sup
(
p 6 max
i
pi(1) | Prob
(∑
j∈U
qj(p) +
∑
i∈I
qi(p)(·) > S
)
> 0
)
.
We characterize equilibria with some amount of successful participation by less informed
bidders. As the following result clarifies, successful uninformed participation, essential to
fulfill the stated goal of open participation, comes at a cost. The fact that uninformed
bidders win some units can distort the information content of the auction price, reducing
the signalling ability of the central bank.
Theorem 2. Under assumption 1, any equilibrium with some successful
participation by uninformed bidders is characterized by m(S) = mU(S) =
mI(S), with no atom of uninformed bids at m(S).
Two properties of any such equilibrium are worth noting. First, the equilibrium is char-
acterized by partial free riding (defined above, following assumption 1) by the uninformed
bidders. Thus the concerns of the informed bidders with the uniform price format we
discussed above apply here as well.
The second, and more important property is that lower prices are more informative. A
market clearing price close to m(S) cannot signal much - such a price could come about
even if informed bidders receive very low signals. A low auction price, on the other hand,
definitely implies low signals. Prices in our model directly translate to interest rates - a
higher price paid by a bidder corresponds to a higher interest rate paid by a bidder. The
result indicates that a low repo rate should have a greater impact on the money market
compared to a high repo rate. As Nautz (1997) reports, this is exactly what happened
under the Bundesbank uniform price repo auctions. Thus our results clarify the theory
behind the Bundesbank experience with uniform price repo auctions and explain the
policy choice of central banks to move away from the uniform price format in conducting
monetary policy through repo auctions.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Treasury Auctions
Treasury auctions are among the most important of all auctions in terms of their impact
on the economy. The US Treasury raises billions of dollars every week from sales of
Treasury securities.
Like repo auctions, Treasury auctions are multi unit common value auctions. Although,
unlike repo auctions, there is no intent of signalling policy stance, free riding has other
important implications. In the US, participation in treasury auctions is open, and there
are many smaller, relatively uninformed bidders alongside a few primary dealers. In this
setting, it is important to provide encouragement to less informed bidders to participate.
As the paper shows, uninformed bidders can free ride on the informed bidders in uniform
price auctions, and thus this format is appropriate in encouraging wider participation. In
discriminatory auctions, on the other hand, bidders pay their own bids for units they win
in an auction. This precludes the possibility of free riding and discourages participation
by less informed bidders. At the same time, since free-riding tends to shift the distribution
of market clearing price upward, it does not harm revenue(16).
As our results show, in repo auctions, the use of a uniform price format to provide an
advantage to smaller, less informed bidders comes at a cost - the monetary policy signal
gets distorted. In contrast, as the above discussion shows, Treasury auctions do not face
this tradeoff. This sheds light on the rationale behind the complete switch to a uniform
price format (from a practice of using the discriminatory format for most auctions) by
the US Treasury in 1998(17).
While the US now uses only the uniform price format, Treasury auctions in countries
such as UK and Germany have always used discriminatory auctions. In these countries,
only members of a specific group(18) are allowed to bid in Treasury auctions. To restrict
(16)Whether free riding in uniform price auctions translates into greater revenue compared to a discrim-
inatory auction is an interesting question. However, addressing this requires a detailed characterization
of equilibria in discriminatory auctions, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
(17)Ironically, discriminatory auctions are called “American auctions” in the banking industry even
though this format is no longer used by the US Treasury.
(18)In the UK, these are the GEMMs (Gilt-Edged Market Makers), and in Germany these are members
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participation to a group consisting a few larger, informed banks (who are then given
incentives to be very active in bidding), it is better to choose a discriminatory framework.
This discourages entry in the group by less informed bidders by eliminating the possibility
of free riding. This sheds light on the cross-country differences in Treasury auction format.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Treasury auctions have an institutionalized free
riding facility to help small, less informed bidders. Treasury auctions as well as other
common value multi-unit auctions such as Hambrecht’s OpenBook auction(19) allow non-
competitive bids which are quantity-only bids to be filled at the auction price (average
auction price in case of discriminatory auctions). Such bids are exactly like bids of the
associated quantities at the highest possible price, and thus allow free riding. This un-
derlines the importance of free riding in such auctions, and strengthens the explanation
we have provided for the switch to uniform price auctions by the US Treasury.
6.2 Auction Theory
Finally, we note our contribution to auction theory. In a uniform price auction, all bidders
pay the market clearing price. We define this as the highest price at which the demand
equals or exceeds supply(20). In a single unit auction, the market clearing price coincides
with the highest bid. Thus with a single unit, the analysis of a uniform price auction
coincides with the analysis of a single-unit first-price common-value auction. Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983) (EMW) analyze a single-unit common-value first-
price auction with a single informed bidder and several uniformed bidders and derive the
unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium uninformed bidders earn a zero profit.
The results here show that going from one unit to even two changes the flavor of the
results substantially when a uniform-price rule is used. With more than one unit, free
riding becomes possible, and thus uninformed bidders can earn a positive profit. Further,
the equilibrium derived in EMW is not robust to any cost of entry or bidding. Any
of the “Bund Issues Auction Group.”
(19)This is an online auction set up by the investment banker W.R. Hambrecht for selling corporate
bonds. See Hall (2001) for details.
(20)As noted before in footnote (6), Some authors define the uniform price as the highest losing bid.
However, this is never used in policy applications. Our definition is the one used in all practical applica-
tions.
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such positive cost implies that deviation to non-participation is better for an uninformed
bidder. Here, on the other hand, equilibria characterized by free riding are robust to
entry/bidding costs. Moreover, under any such cost, if we also exclude the possibility
of an outsider entering a earning a strictly positive profit, all equilibria are necessarily
characterized by free riding.
Finally, in a multi-unit uniform-price auction, the auction price depends on the entire pro-
file of demand functions (i.e. vectors of prices and associated quantities submitted). This
makes the possible set of equilibria large and not very tractable. Here, the no-arbitrage
condition and robustness to entry cost help us characterize all potential equilibria.
7 Conclusion
We characterize equilibria in a repo auction - which is a multi-unit common value auc-
tion - under a uniform price rule. We show that all equilibria in which some uninformed
bidders participate are characterized by the latter free riding on the information of the
informed bidders. The result shows that the usual intuition about the value of exclusive
information in strategic settings may not hold in a uniform price auction, and explains
the concerns of large banks participating in repo auctions conducted by the Bundesbank.
Further, we show that the presence of a large number of uninformed bidders can distort
the signalling ability of auction prices so that higher auction prices are less informative
than lower prices. This impairs the ability of the central bank to signal monetary policy
stance. The results explain the problem central banks face in using the uniform price
format to implement monetary policy through repo auctions. The Bundesbank in the 80s
as well as the Reserve bank of India in 2001 abandoned uniform price auctions in favor
discriminatory auctions. The US Treasury, on the other hand, abandoned the discrimina-
tory framework and switched to using only the uniform price format in selling government
bonds. In a Treasury auction, there is no signalling intent, and the possibility of free rid-
ing creates an advantage for less informed bidders, encouraging wider participation. This
sheds light on the rationale behind US Treasury policy.
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8 Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Note that the market clearing pricem(K),K 6 S, is a random variable with a distribution
induced by the mixed strategies of the uninformed bidders and the distribution of signals
received by informed bidders(21).
Suppose an outsider enters and bids a price-quantity pair (b, 1) (which is a demand func-
tion of the simplest form) where b is in the support of the market clearing price m(S).
For any given strategy profile of the bidders, the entrant’s profit from the price-quantity
pair (b, 1) is given by:
πE({b, 1}) = Prob(m(S − 1) > b > m(S))E(V − b|m(S − 1) > b > m(S))
+ Prob(b > m(S − 1))E(V −m(S − 1)|b > m(S − 1))
> Prob(b > m(S))E(V − b|b > m(S)) (A.1)
Recall that the aggregate demand of informed bidders is denoted by PI(Q) = (PI1, . . . , PIS).
Let the aggregate demand of the uninformed bidders be denoted by PU(Q) = (PU1, . . . , PUS).
Now, suppose there is extreme free riding in equilibrium over (S−1) units. Then aggregate
demand is (S−1) at prices above the highest market clearing pricem(S). Thusm(S−1) 6<
m(S) - i.e. any price b in the support of m(S) never exceeds m(S − 1). Thus
Prob(b > m(S)) = Prob (b > PUS)Prob (b > PI1) .
Therefore the payoff of the outsider from the bid (b, 1) is given by
πE({b, 1}) = Prob(b > m(S))E(V − b|b > m(S))
= Prob (b > PUS)Prob (b > PI1)E(V − b|b > PI1)
Thus to ensure absence of arbitrage, E(V − b|b > PI1) 6 0.
In the absence of extreme free riding over (S − 1) units, the supports of m(S − 1) and
m(S) overlap, and for any b in the support of m(S) we have Prob(b > m(S − 1)) > 0.
(21)Let Γ denote the distribution of aggregate demand. The market clearing price m(K) is a random
variable with a distribution given by the marginal distribution of Γ over the K-th unit.
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Then (A.1) holds with strict inequality, and therefore, satisfying no-arbitrage requires
E(V − b|b > PI1) < 0.‖
A.2 Proof of theorem 1
Suppose an uniformed bidder j ∈ U bids strictly positive prices on k units with strictly
positive probability. Since a demand function of bidder j can be written as a vector of
prices (p
(j)
1 , p
(j)
2 , . . . , p
(j)
S ) where p
(j)
1 > p
(j)
2 > . . . > p
(j)
S > 0, another way of saying the
above is that p
(j)
k > 0 with strictly positive probability.
Then let p
j
(k) denote the infimum of the set of strictly positive prices p
(j)
K that are
submitted by bidder j with strictly positive probability. Formally, p
j
(k) = inf(p
(j)
k |p
(j)
k >
0).
Let us proceed to prove the theorem. In equilibrium, for any uninformed bidder j, and
for any k, either p
j
(k) > m(S), or p
j
(k) < m(S).
If the former condition holds for all j ∈ U , equilibria are characterized by extreme free
riding, and the proof is done.
Next, suppose for some j, p
j
(k) < m(S). We claim that in any such equilibrium, for each
uninformed bidder j, p
j
(k) > 0 for some k > 1. To see this, suppose not. Then for any
j, p
j
(k) = 0 for all k 6 S. But a bid at 0 must earn zero payoff in equilibrium (otherwise
outsiders can enter and bid 0 and share the positive payoff to be had at a bid of 0) - and
since uninformed bidders are playing a mixed strategy equilibrium, all their bids must
earn a zero payoff. But then the strategies would not survive introduction of any positive
entry cost. Thus any equilibrium strategy profile that is robust to entry cost must have
the property that for each uninformed bidder j, p
j
(k) > 0 for some k > 1.
Let Kj = max(k|pj(k) > 0). Thus bidder j free rides on Kj units. For all participating
uninformed bidders to successfully free ride, market must clear with positive probability
at bids by informed bidders even below the lowest p
j
(Kj). This is ensured if
∑
j Kj < S,
which we now proceed to show.
Consider the aggregate demand of uninformed bidders other than uninformed bidder j.
Let this be denoted by p−j(q) = (p(−j),1, p(−j),2, . . .).
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Let p
(−j)
(k) be the lowest price at which the aggregate demand of uninformed bidders
other than 1 equal or exceed k, and let K−j denote the total amount on which uninformed
bidders other than j free ride (thus K−j =
∑
ℓ∈U,ℓ 6=jKℓ).
For the result to hold, we must have Kj +K−j < S for all j ∈ U . This requires p(−j)(S −
Kj) = 0. Suppose not. Then suppose p(−j)(S −Kj) > 0.
Now, there is always some j such that p
j
(Kj) 6 p(−j)(S−Kj). Without loss of generality,
let this be true for j = 1. Thus the rest of the proof refers to uninformed bidder 1.
Further, to reduce notation, let the quantity demanded by uninformed bidder 1 be K1 =
K.
Case 1: There is no atom at p
(−1)
(S −K).
Note that we have started with the supposition that p
1
(K) 6 p
(−1)
(S −K).
Then any p1,K ∈ [p1(K), p(−1)(S−K)] wins only if p(−1),(S−K+1) 6 p1,K and PI1 6 p1,K
(22).
Compare two demand functions of bidder 1: p(1)(q) =
(
p
(1)
1 , . . . , p
(1)
S
)
, and p(2)(q) =(
p
(2)
1 , . . . , p
(2)
S
)
such that the demand functions are identical up to K− 1 units, but differ
on the K-th unit (and do not demand any further units at any positive price):
p
(1)
ℓ = p
(2)
ℓ for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1},
p
(1)
K = b > 0 = p
(2)
1K
p(1)m = 0 = p
(2)
m for m ∈ {K + 1, . . . , S},
where b 6 p
(−1)
(S −K).
Let D denote the amount by which the payoff of bidder 1 from p(1)(·) exceeds that from
p(2)(·):
D = Prob(PI1 6 b)Prob(p(−1),(S−K+1) 6 b)
[
KE(V − b|PI1 6 b)
− (K − 1)E
(
V −max
(
PI1, p(−1),(S−K+1)
)
|PI1 6 b
)]
< Prob(PI1 6 b)Prob(p(−1),(S−K+1) 6 b)E(V − b|PI1 6 b)
< 0,
(22)Note that if there is an atom at p
(−1)
(S−K), p1,K = p(−1)(S−K) could win even if these conditions
are not satisfied.
20
where the last step follows as before from (4.1). Thus p(2)(·) yields a strictly greater
payoff. Since this is true for any 0 < b 6 p
(−1)
(S −K), and thus p1K = p(−1)(S −K) is
strictly worse than p1K = 0, there exists ξ > 0 such that in equilibrium
p1,K 6∈ (0, p(−1)(S −K) + ξ].
This implies that p
1
(K) > p
(−1)
(S −K), which contradicts the original supposition.
Thus there is no equilibrium with p
(−j)
(S −Kj) > 0 for any j ∈ U .
Case 2: There is an atom at p
(−1)
(S −K).
The same argument as in case 1 above now applies to p1,K ∈ (0, p(−1)(S −K)). Thus, by
the argument for case 1, p1K 6∈ (0, p(−1)(S −K)). The only remaining possibility is that
p
1
(K) = p
(−1)
(S −K).
Suppose p
1
(K) = p
(−1)
(S − K) is preferred to p1K = 0 (otherwise the proof is already
done). But then by raising p1K by a very small amount 1 can improve his payoff as
price paid increases continuously while expected quantity won changes discontinuously.
Thus there is no atom at p
1
(K). But then, by an argument analogous to case 1, bids at
p
(−1)
(S −K) (by some bidder j) earn a negative payoff. Thus if in equilibrium p
1
(K) =
p
(−1)
(S −K), there cannot be an atom at p
(−1)
(S −K). Therefore if there is an atom at
p
(−1)
(S −K), the only possibility is p
1
(K) > p
(−1)
(S −K) which contradicts the original
supposition.
Thus again there is no equilibrium with p
(−j)
(S − Kj) > 0 for any j ∈ U . This proves
that
∑
j∈U Kj < S. Therefore any equilibrium must be characterized by free riding.‖
A.3 Proof of theorem 2
The proof proceeds through the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Under assumption 1, mU(S) 6> mI(S).
Proof: Suppose not. Then it is possible to have mU(S) > mI(S) in equilibrium. In this
case, m(S) = mU(S) > mI(S).
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Case 1: mU(S) > EV In this case, whenever market clears at prices in the interval
(max(mI(S), EV ), mU(S)] the uninformed bidders earn a strictly negative payoff. In this
case, an uninformed bidder has a profitable deviation as follows.
There is some bidder j whose demand function involves prices above mI(S). Suppose
j demands a total Kj units. Consider a deviation by j to a flat demand of Kj at price
mI(S). Then j wins nothing whenever market clears abovemI(S) (thus reducing negative
payoff) - and still wins all Kj units when market clears at bids made by informed bidders
below mI(S). Thus the deviation is profitable.
Case 2: mU(S) 6 EV Consider a price-quantity pair (EV, 1) bid by an outsider. If
uninformed bidders bid so that market clears below EV with positive probability, then
this bid makes a strictly positive profit, violating the no-arbitrage condition. Suppose
uninformed bidders bid at EV so that the market never clears below EV . Then ifmU(S) >
mI(S), informed bidders make a zero payoff. But then for a sufficiently high signal, an
informed bidder can bid just above EV , win with probability 1, and make a positive
profit. Thus it is not possible to have mU(S) > mI(S).‖
Next, the fact that uninformed bidders win a positive quantity implies that mU(K) 6<
mI(K). From this, and from lemma 2, in any equilibrium with some successful participa-
tion by uninformed bidders, we must have m(S) = mU(S) = mI(S).
Finally, we need to show that there is no atom of uninformed bids at m(S).
Suppose, on the contrary, that the distribution of market clearing bid has an atom of
uninformed demand at mU(S).
Now, if m(S) < EV , an outsider could bid a price-quantity pair (EV, 1) and make a
strictly positive profit. Thus we must have m(S) > EV , which implies mU(S) > EV .
Thus whenever market clears at mU(S) the uninformed bidders earn a non-positive gross
payoff (and a strictly negative payoff net of entry cost). Consider a deviation by unin-
formed bidder j to a price just below mU(S). This suffers a second order loss compared to
the original bid whenever market clears below mU(S), but enjoys a first order gain when-
ever market clears exactly at mU(S). Thus the deviation is profitable. Contradiction.‖
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